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Abstract 
This study examines whether there are systematic differences between early adopters 
and a matched control group of non-early adopters of Malaysian Accounting 
Standards Board 22 on segment reporting. Using a sample of 32 early adopters and a 
matched-pair of non-early adopters, our findings show that early adopters have 
significantly higher proportion of non-executive directors, particularly non- 
independent non-executives, than non-early adopters. Further analysis shows that fill 
early adopters are significantly larger in size than non-early adopters, but partial early 
adopters are significantly smaller in size than non-early adopters. Furthermore, partial 
adopters also tend to have significantly greater proportion of non-executive directors 
(especially non-independent) than non-early adopters. 
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1. Introduction 
An important area of accounting research focuses on managers' voluntary 
accounting choice. Fields et al. (2001) provide a critical review of the empirical 
research on accounting choice in the 1990s and conclude that the evidence on the 
motivations behind accounting methods choice is largely circumstantial and direct and 
compelling evidence is still elusive. 
In this study we focus on one aspect of voluntary accounting choice namely 
the adoption of an accounting standard prior to its effective date, and relate it to board 
characteristics. In most cases, early adoption affects the income statement or balance 
sheet accounts. In other cases, early adoption affects the level of disclosure or merely 
changes the format of the financial statements without affecting the account balances. 
Studies on early adoption to date (Ayres, 1986; Salatka, 1989; Trombley, 1989; 
Karmon and Lubwama, 1997) use accounting standards in the US that have income 
and balance sheet ramifications. Ayres (1986) and Trombley (1989) examine the 
characteristics of early adopters, Salatka (1989) investigates the economic 
consequences of early adoption and Karmon and Lubwama (1997) document 
opportunistic behavior motivates managers to be early adopters. 
This study extends the literature on the timing of accounting standard adoption 
on two fronts. Firstly, it examines early adoption in Malaysia, a country with different 
institutional and regulatory features, and secondly it uses an accounting standard on 
segment reporting that leads to greater information disclosure without affecting 
income or balance sheet accounts. Although there are several studies that examine 
factors that motivate accounting method choice and voluntary disclosures in 
Malaysia, we are not aware of any empirical studies that seek to explain early 
adoption of accounting standards in Malaysia. In addition, segment reporting is a 
deserving area to study following recent calls for improvement in segment disclosures 
(see for example the OECD's White Paper on Corporate Governance in Asia, 2003; 
AIMR, 2000). 
Given that early adoption of Malaysian Accounting Standards Board (MASB) 
22: Segment Reporting is similar to providing voluntary disclosures, this study seeks 
to find out whether there are systematic differences between early adopters and a 
matched control group of non-early adopters of MASB 22 based on several company 
characteristics, including board characteristics. Recent studies seeking to explain the 
determinants of specific disclosures which are similar to ours include Watson et al. 
(2002) which examines disclosure of accounting ratios and Wallace et al. (1999) 
which examines the comprehensiveness of cash flow reporting. However they do not 
specifically examine the role of board characteristics and financial disclosures. Eng 
and Mak (2003) and Ho and Wong (2001) incorporate board characteristics in their 
comprehensive voluntary disclosure studies. 
Using a sample of 32 early adopters and without differentiating whether they 
disclose the required segment information in full or partially and a control group of 32 
non-early adopters, our findings indicate that the characteristic that distinguishes 
between early and non-early adopters is non-executive directors. Early adopters have 
significantly higher proportion of non-executive directors, particularly non- 
independent non-executives, than non-early adopters. Inspired by Powell (1997), 
when early adopters are fiuther classified into full or partial adopters, the result shows 
that full early adopters are significantly larger (in terms of total assets) than non-early 
adopters. However, when comparing between partial early adopters and non-early 
adopters, the evidence suggests that partial early adopters are significantly smaller in 
size than non-early adopters. This finding suggests that smaller companies may opt to 
adopt early to create a positive impression although in actual fact they are not making 
full segment disclosures. Furthermore, partial adopters also tend to have significantly 
greater proportion of non-executive directors (especially non-independent) than non- 
early adopters. We find no evidence to indicate that there are significant differences 
between full early adopters, partial early adopters and non-early adopters in terms of 
board size, board leadership, independent directors, leverage, audit firm size and 
earnings volatility. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we provide 
background information on the financial reporting framework and segment 
disclosures in Malaysia and a brief review of the relevant literature in order to 
formulate the hypotheses. The methodology section explains the identification of 
early adopters, procedure adopted to match early adopters against non-early adopters, 
data collection and the regression methods used. The findings discussed the 
descriptive statistics and results from univariate analysis, binary logistic regression 
and multinomial regression. The final section contains conclusion, limitation and 
suggestions for future research. 
2. Literature Review 
2.1 Financial Reporting Framework and Segment Disclosures in Malaysia 
Initially, financial reporting practices in Malaysia were based on compliance 
with the Ninth Schedule of Companies Act 1965 and accounting standards 
promulgated by the two professional accounting bodies; The Malaysian Institute of 
Accountants (MIA) and the Malaysian Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
(MICPA). In 1997, the MASB and Financial Reporting Foundation (FRF) were 
established under the Financial Reporting Act 1997 in order to raise the level of 
corporate reporting for Malaysian companies. MASB is established as an 
independent authority to develop and issue accounting and financial reporting 
standards in Malaysia. The function of MASB is to review, revise or adopt existing 
accounting standards as approved accounting standards. As at the date of writing, 
MASB has issued 33 accounting standards, including an accounting standard on 
presentation of financial statements of islamic financial institutions. The FRF is a 
trustee body and has responsibility for oversight of the MASB's performance, 
financial and funding arrangements and as an initial source of views for the MASB on 
proposed standards and pronouncements. With this regulatory change Malaysia 
became the first country in Asia to set up an independent and statutorily incorporated 
accounting standard-setting body with representation from all relevant parties in the 
standard-setting process, including preparers, users, regulators and accounting 
profession. The Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE) requires its listed companies 
to comply with all the MASB approved accounting standards. 
Prior to 2002, KLSE-listed companies were required to comply with the 
original International Accounting Standard (IAS) 14, one of the extant accounting 
standards approved by the MASB. The revised IAS 14 which became effective for 
periods beginning on or after 1 July 1998 was not adopted in Malaysia. With the 
recent introduction of MASB 22: Segment Reporting, listed companies in Malaysia 
are now required to disclose segment data similar to the requirements under the 
revised IAS 14 for the periods beginning on or after 1 January 2002. The MASB 22- 
cum-IAS 14 (revised) presents major departures from the original IAS 14. The 
differences include the adoption of two-tier segmentation with either the business 
segment or the geographical segment as the dominant basis of segment reporting 
(primary) and the other secondary, differential information disclosure for primary 
segment (full disclosure) and secondary segment (less disclosure), consistent use of 
accounting policies across segments and standardized measure of segment results 
across companies. 
Some companies have elected to adopt MASB 22 prior to its effective date, 
thereby voluntarily disclose more information especially for the primary basis of 
segment reporting since they have to provide additional disclosures such as 
depreciation and amortization expenses and other significant non-cash expenses by 
reportable segments to enable users to "predict the overall amounts, timing, or risks of 
a complete enterprise's future cash flows". In addition, unlike the original IAS 14, 
MASB 22 also requires disclosures of segment liabilities in the primary segment 
reports and capital expenditure in both the primary and secondary segment reports, if 
any. Appendix 1 highlights the mandatory items to be disclosed in the primary 
segment reporting. 
2.2 Prior Studies and Hypotheses Development 
Empirical studies investigating the determinants of extensiveness of segment 
disclosures, levels of voluntary disclosures or comprehensiveness of mandatory 
disclosures around the world invariably consider company specific factors to explain 
the varying levels of disclosures. Ahmed and Courtis (1999) provide a meta-analysis 
of 29 comprehensive disclosure studies between 1968 and 1997 and conclude that 
disclosure levels have positive relationships with fm size and leverage.' They 
conclude the lack of conclusive findings between other company attributes and 
corporate disclosure is due to differences in disclosure index construction and 
definition of the explanatory variables. 
Of late there emerged new studies that relate corporate governance with 
corporate transparency (Eng and Mak, 2003; Bujaki and McConomy, 2002; Ho and 
Wong, 2001). The level of corporate governance in a firm is determined to a large 
extent by the composition of its board of directors i.e. the balance between outside 
and inside directors and whether the chairman of the board and the Chief Executive 
Officer (CEO) being the same person. It has been widely recognized that independent 
boards are essential to a sound governance structure. A CEO who is also chairman of 
the board usually signifies that the management is controlled by a dominant 
personality (Molz, 1988). The person who occupies both roles, i.e. duality board 
leadership, tends to withhold information to external users. 
Farna and Jensen (1983) and Forker (1992) assert that the larger the proportion 
of independent or non-executive directors on the board, the more effective they are in 
monitoring management and corporate boards resulting in lower managerial 
opportunism and tendency to withhold information. Thus, independent or non- 
executive directors on board would improve the quality of financial disclosure. 
Similarly, Chen and Jaggi (2000) argue that greater representation of independent or 
non-executive directors on corporate board enable them to exert greater influence on 
management and encourage better compliance with mandatory disclosure 
requirements. Likewise, Eng and Mak (2003) assert that independent or outside 
directors who are less aligned to management have greater tendency to encourage 
firm to disclose more voluntary information to outside directors. 
Forker (1992) finds a significant negative relationship between the existence 
of a dominant personality and the quality of share option disclosure. On the other 
hand, Ho and Wong (2001) investigate whether CEOIChairman duality affects the 
extent of voluntary disclosure in Hong Kong and obtain positive but insignificant 
coefficient at the conventional level. Contrary to expectation, Haniffa and Cooke 
(2002) show that the presence of non-executive chairman on board is negatively 
associated with the extent of voluntary disclosure in Malaysia. 
Although Chen and Jaggi (2000) find a positive relationship between the 
proportion of independent directors on board and comprehensiveness of mandatory 
financial disclosure in Hong Kong, Forker (1992) fails to find a positive association 
between non-executive directors and the quality of stock options disclosure. He 
attributes the lack of empirical support to the measurement error arising from the non- 
disclosure of information on non-executive director by some firms. Using Singapore 
data, Eng and Mak (2003) find that higher outside directorship reduces voluntary 
disclosure. 
In Malaysia, the role of independent directors in improving corporate 
governance has also been recognized. The voluntary Malaysian Code on Corporate 
Governance (available at http://sc.com.myhtmVpublications/inhouse/cgepo~OOO) 
released in 2000 recommends (1) the separation of Board Chairman and CEO and (2) 
at least two members or one third of corporate board, whichever is higher, are 
independent directors. Based on the foregoing discussion, we hypothesized that: 
HI: Ceteris paribus, there is a negative association between CEO 
duality and early adoption of MASB 22. 
H2: Ceteris paribus, there is a positive association between the 
proportion of non-executive directors and early adoption of MASB 22. 
3. Research Methodology 
3.1 Sample Selection and Data Source 
A total of 64 companies comprising 32 early adopters of MASB 22 and a 
control group of 32 non-early adopters are examined in this study. Early adopters are 
mainly identified by searching the 2001 and 2002 annual reports andlor annual 
audited accounts (excluding financial statements ended on 31 December 2002) in the 
KLSE LINK database (httu://www.klse.com.m~lannouncements) for phrases unique 
to MASB 22 such as "primary reporting", "segment liabilities", "MASB 22", 
"standard 22" and "standard no 22". The early adopters are matched on a paired basis 
with non-early adopters based on similar board of exchange (main or second board), 
KLSE sectoral classification, financial year end and number of business segments 
(plus or minus one is acceptable if exact matching is not possible). 
For all the sample companies, we hand collect information from the annual 
reports relating to board composition (size of board, number of executives, number of 
non-executives (NONEXEC) comprising independent non-executive directors (INED) 
and non-independent non-executive directors (NINED)), board leadership and auditor. 
The number of business and geographical segments for sample companies are 
obtained from the segment disclosures in the notes to the financial statements. 
Financial data such as total assets, total liabilities, profit before tax (for the last five 
years) are taken from the KLSE-RIS -). 
We scrutinize the early adopters' segment disclosures and code the accounting 
treatments for the mandatory items in the primary segment reporting format (please 
refer Appendix 1) as follows: (A) allocated to segments, (U) disclosed in aggregate in 
segment report without allocating to segments i.e. unallocated, (NA) not applicable 
(since the items are also not disclosed elsewhere in the consolidated financial 
statements, and (ND) not disclosed in segment report although they are disclosed 
elsewhere in the consolidated financial statements. Early adopters with at least one 
item designated " N D  are deemed not complying fully with MASB 22 disclosures 
and categorized as partial early adopters, and the remaining are labeled full early 
adopters. These procedures yield 15 full and 17 partial early adopters. The most 
glaring disclosure deficiency is the failure to disaggregate non-cash expenses other 
than depreciation and amortization by reportable segments. Other deficiencies include 
non-disclosure of capital expenditure and investment in equity method associates by 
reportable segments. There are also a few instances where the basis for inter-segment 
pricing is mentioned in the related party disclosure rather than in the segment report. 
3.2 Testing the Relationship Between Early Adoption and Board Characteristics 
We run two logistic regression models; binary and multinomial. In the binary 
model, the dependent variable is dichotomous and takes the value of either 1 (early 
adopters) or 0 (non-early adopters) and in the multinomial model the dependent 
variable is trichotomous and takes the value of 0 (full early adopters), 1 (partial early 
adopters) and 2 (non-early adopters). The motivation to run both binary and 
multinomial models comes from Powell (1997). He shows that in modeling the 
relationship between firm's characteristics and its takeover likelihood more insight 
can be gained from segregating takeover targets into hostile or friendly than treating 
them as homogeneous. He cautions that "the use of a binomial specification to model 
takeover likelihood is likely to be incorrect and conclusions based on such a model 
are likely to be misleading and result in incorrect inferences regarding the 
characteristics of firms subject to takeover" (p. 1026). 
The independent variables used in both models are board composition 
(NONEXEC and DUALITY), and control variables such as company size, leverage, 
audit firm size and earnings volatility. Studies by Chow and Wong-Boren (1987), 
Ahrned and Courtis (1999) and Eng and Mak (2003) show that the level of disclosure 
is related to firm size, leverage and audit firm size. Waymire (1985) shows that 
companies that issue management's earnings forecast more frequently have lower 
earnings volatility than companies that issue management's forecasts on an infrequent 
basis, consistent with Imhoff (1978) and Ruland (1979). 
We measure NONEXEC as the proportion of independent and non- 
independent (i.e. dependent) non-executive directors who sit on the board. 
DUALITY takes a value of 1 if the same person holds both the posts of chairman and 
CEO. We use the natural log of total assets (LNASSET) as a proxy for company size. 
LEVERAGE is measured as total liabilities divided by total assets and AUDIT takes a 
value of 1 if the company is audited by "Big 4". In common with previous study by 
Mitchell et al. (1995), earnings volatility (VOLATILE) is measured by taking the 
difference between maximum and minimum profit before tax for five years divided by 
average profit before tax. 
4.  Findings 
4.1 Sample Characteristics 
A summary of the characteristics of sample companies is reported in Table 1. 
Panel A shows the characteristic of sample by board of exchange. Twenty-two 
(68.75%) early adopters are from the Main Board and the other 10 (31.25%) are from 
the Second Board. With respect to sector, nearly 70 percent come from four sectors 
namely construction, consumer products, industrial products and plantation. Panels C 
and D display information on number of business segments and geographical 
segments. The early adopters have, on average, four business segments and 70 percent 
of them have not more than two geographical segments. Panel E shows that 20 early 
adopters adopted MASB 22 for their financial years ended on or before 3 1 December 
2001 while another 12 adopted for financial years ended between 31 January 2002 
and before 3 1 December 2002. 
The "Big 4" audits three quarter of early adopters. In terms of board 
leadership, six early adopters (about 19%) have duality board leadership structure 
where the same person holds both the CEO and Chairman roles. This is consistent 
with the findings from the Corporate Governance Survey 2002 jointly organized by 
KLSEPWC where 15 percent of listed companies have Chairmen who hold dual 
roles. Although not reported in Table 1, our sample results indicate that companies 
that do not separate the role of Chairman and CEO also have significantly smaller 
board (mean board size of 6.3 vs. 7.9) and are more likely to be fiom the Main Board 
(83 percent vs. 65 percent) and audited by Big 4 (83 percent versus 73 percent) than 
their counterparts. It is coincidental that the proportions of Big 4 auditor and duality 
among the non-early adopters are identical to early adopters. 
4.2 Univariate Analysis 
Table 2 gives the descriptive statistics of continuous independent variables 
included in the study, partitioned by fill  early adopters, partial early adopters and 
non-early adopters. Comparing between early and non-early adopters shows that early 
adopters are twice as large as non-early adopters, have lower leverage and greater 
earnings volatility. However none of these differences are significant. For early 
adopters, the proportion of non-executive directors (dependent non-executive 
directors) is about 67 percent (30 percent) compared to 57 percent (19 percent) for 
non-early adopters, and these differences are significant at ten (five) percent levels. 
Comparatively, the mean values for board size and independent non-executive 
directors are almost similar between early adopters and non-early adopters. The 
average board size of eight and the minimum proportion of independent directors 
which is less than one-third are identical to the findings fiom KLSEPWC Corporate 
Governance Survey 2002. The survey reveals that the boards on average has eight 
directors and there are still a few companies which have not met the KLSE 
requirements of having a minimum of two or one-third independent directors on the 
board, whichever is higher. Although not reported in Table 2, further analysis shows 
that in our sample there are eight companies (13 percent) that do not meet the KLSE 
requirement pertaining to composition of independent directors, of which four are full 
adopters, one is partial adopters and three are non-early adopters. Other points worth 
noting are the proportions of non-executive directors (and non-independent non- 
executives) are highest for full adopters, followed by partial and non-early adopters. 
The proportions of independent non-executives are identical for all subgroups. 
4.3 Multivariate Analysis 
The Pearson correlations between the variables are shown in Table 3. The 
proportion of non-executive directors is positively correlated with firm size and Big 4 
auditor whilst leverage is negatively correlated with earnings volatility. However, 
none of the correlation coefficients among the independent variables are greater than 
0.4. 
Table 4 presents parameter estimates of binomial and multinomial models 
with corresponding coefficient values and standard errors. For the binomial regression 
(model l), positive sign on a parameter indicates that an increase in the corresponding 
variable increases the likelihood of early adoption and a negative sign indicates the 
opposite. For the multinomial regression (model Z), the parameters are interpreted as 
indicating the probability of an event, either being a full adopter or partial adopter, 
relative to the probability of being non-early adopter. 
The results show that model 1 has a likelihood ratio of 82.90 1 with six degree 
of freedom. The Nagekerke R~ of 0.116 indicates mild relationship between 
dependent variable and independent variables. In addition the Hosmer and Lemeshow 
goodness of fit gives a chi-square of 8.614 (level of significance is 0.376) which 
indicates a good model fit between the actual and predicted value of the dependent 
variable. The percentage of correct classification for model 1 is 54.7 percent. The 
result reveals that only NONEXEC is significant at 10 percent level with positive 
direction. This suggests that the higher the composition of non-executive directors on 
the board the higher the likelihood to early adopt MASB 22. Interesting evidence is 
found when replacing NONEXEC with independent non-executives (INED) and non- 
independent non-executives (NINED). INED is found to be insignificant, whilst 
NINED is significant at five percent level with positive direction. This indicates that 
the dependent non-executive directors may play some important role in deciding on 
early adoption, but not independent directors. The results are consistent with the 
univariate analysis that shows early adopters have significantly higher percentage of 
dependent non-executive directors than non-early adopters, whilst the proportions of 
independent directors are identical for early and non-early adopters. 
For model 2, the likelihood ratio is 110.91 1 with 12 degree of freedom and 
significant at five percent level. When early adopters are partitioned into full adopters 
and partial adopters, the strength of the relationship as indicated by the Nagelkerke R~ 
is higher than model 1. Thus the multinomial model has a better explanatory power 
than the binary model that treats full and partial early adopters as homogeneous 
group. For full adopters, LNASSET is found to be significant at five percent level 
with positive direction which suggests that larger firm is more likely to early adopt 
MASB 22 (with full disclosure) and less likely to delay adoption of MASB 22. For 
partial adopters, variables LNASSET and NONEXEC are found to be significant at 
10 percent level but having negative direction for LNASSET. The result suggests that 
the higher the proportion of NONEXEC increases the likelihood for firm to adopt 
partial disclosure of segment information in accordance with MASB 22 as opposed to 
not adopting MASB 22 at all. Interestingly smaller firms also tend to adopt partial 
disclosure of segment information in accordance with MASB 22 as opposed to not 
adopting MASB 22 at all. However, in the binary model there is no evidence that 
firm size is an important characteristic that distinguishes between f m s  that elect 
early adoption versus defer adoption until the mandatory date. Thus, the model that 
pools full and partial early adopters as homogeneous is probably misspecified and 
yields spurious result that obscures the effect of fm size. The evidence which shows 
that smaller companies are more likely to adopt MASB 22 ahead of the mandated 
period, albeit with less than full primary segment disclosure, than delay adoption 
suggests there is a possibility that the decision to adopt early is a charade to create a 
positive impression. All in all, the results for the multivariate regressions are 
consistent with the univariate analysis. 
5. Conclusion 
The study reveals several interesting results on the characteristics of early 
adopters. First, full early adopters have larger size of assets than non-early adopters. 
Second, companies having smaller size of assets also made early adoption but they 
only complied partially with the segment disclosures. Third, the evidence suggests 
that non-executive directors do play some role towards early adoption of MASB 22. 
However the evidence indicates that dependent rather than independent non-executive 
directors are the one who probably make the difference between electing early 
adoption and delaying adoption. Our evidence which shows that a multinomial 
framework differentiating between full early adopters and partial early adopters is 
superior to a binomial framework is consistent with Powell (1997). 
The study is not without its limitations. The low R~ suggests that there may be 
other important variables that are left out. One possibility is ownership structure. 
Recent studies which show that ownership structure influences the level of disclosure 
include Chau and Gray (2002) and Eng and Mak (2003). It is interesting to see 
whether the inclusion of ownership variable would improve the model, and to 
compare the determinants of early adoption for standards that affect the extent of 
disclosure only against standard that affect income and balance sheet figures, such as 
MASB 23 on Impairment of Assets. Another burning research question remains 
unanswered is what are the economic consequences of early adoption of MASB 22 or 
quality of segment disclosures in terms of earnings forecast accuracy and cost of 
capital. 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for Continuous Independent Variables 
Mean 
8 - 
p on-early adopter 1 0.64 1 0.03 1 2.75 1 1.660 
LN(Asset) (RM million): 










































1 on-earlyadopter 1 0.20 1 -14.39 1 26.05 1 0.617 
Full (n=15) and partial adopters (n=17) are subset of early adopters (n=32). There are 32 non-early 
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**significant at 5% level or better (two-tailed and assuming unequal variances). 




























Table 3: Pearson Correlation Matrix 
DV1 is dichotomous devendent variable and takes the value of either 1 (earlv adovters) or 0 (non-earlv 
adopters) and DV2 is tri'chotomous dependent variable and takes the value O ~ O  (full early adopters), i 
(partial early adopters) and 2 (non-early adopters). *** indicates significant at 1% level or better, 
** indicates significant at 5% level or better and * indicates significant at 10% level or better. 









Model 1 Model 2 
Likelihood Ratio 82.901 (df = 6) 110.91 1 (df = 12)** 
Nagelkerke R2 0.1 16 0.333 
McFadden R2 0.166 
Hosmer and Lemeshow 8.614 (df =8) 
Percentage Correct 54.7% 54.7% 
In model 1, the dependent variable is dichotomous and takes the value of either 1 (early adopters) or 0 
(non-early adopters). In model 2, the dependent variable is trichotomous and takes the value of 0 (full 
early adopters), 1 (partial early adopters) and 2 (non-early adopters). ** indicates significant at 5% 
level or better and * indicates significant at 10% level or better. 
Binomial - Model 1 
(n=64) 
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Appendix 1 
Mandatory Disclosures for Primarv Segment Reporting Based on MASB 22 
1. An enterprise should disclose segment revenue for each reportable segment. 
Segment revenue from sales to external customers and segment revenue from 
transactions with other segments should be separately reported. 
2. An enterprise should disclose segment result for each reportable segment. 
3. An enterprise should disclose the total carrying amount of segment assets for 
each reportable segment. 
4. An enterprise should disclose segment liabilities for each reportable segment. 
5. An enterprise should disclose the total cost incurred during the period to 
acquire segment assets that are expected to be used during more than one period 
(property, plant, equipment, and intangible assets) for each reportable segment. 
While this sometimes is referred to as capital additions or capital expenditure, the 
measurement required by this principle should be on an accrual basis, not a cash 
basis. 
6.  An enterprise should disclose the total amount of expense included in segment 
result for depreciation and amortisation of segment assets for the period of each 
reportable segment. 
7. An enterprise should disclose, for each reportable segment, the total amount of 
significant non-cash expenses, other than depreciation and amortisation, that were 
included in segment expense and, therefore, deducted in measuring segment 
result. 
8. An enterprise should disclose, for each reportable segment, the aggregate of the 
enterprise's share of the net profit or loss of associates, joint ventures, or other 
investments accounted for under the equity method if substantially all of those 
associates' operations are within that single segment. 
9. If an enterprise's aggregate share of the net profit or loss of associates, joint 
ventures, or other investments accounted for under the equity method is disclosed 
by reportable segment, the aggregate investments in those associates and joint 
ventures should also be disclosed by reportable segment. 
10. The basis of pricing inter-segment transfers should be disclosed. 
They exclude studies that examine specific disclosure aspects such as segment reporting and 
corporate social reporting. 
